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Abstract
In this paper, I examine whether or not the Hamiltonian and La-
grangian formulations of classical mechanics are equivalent theories. I do
so by applying a standard for equivalence that was recently introduced into
philosophy of science by Halvorson (2012, 2016) and Weatherall (2016a).
This case study yields three general philosophical payoffs. The first is a
specific plea for clarity in our discussions of equivalence, while the second
and third concern how we should interpret what our physical theories say
about the world.
1 Introduction
There is sometimes a sense in which two physical theories are equivalent. A
particularly famous case of this arose in the early years of quantum mechanics.
In brief, this story goes as follows:
There were once two formulations of quantum mechanics. Heisen-
berg had his theory of matrix mechanics, and Schro¨dinger had his
theory of wave mechanics. It seemed that there was a substantive
choice to be made between these two approaches. They used differ-
ent and seemingly incompatible mathematical apparatus, and there-
fore appeared to be distinct theories. Both matrix mechanics and
wave mechanics accounted equally well for the empirical data, how-
ever, so choosing between them proved particularly difficult, and the
debate quickly became acrimonious. Schro¨dinger (1926) was “dis-
couraged” and “repelled” by Heisenberg’s theory and argued that
it “lacked visualizability.” Heisenberg found Schro¨dinger’s theory
“repulsive” and claimed that “what Schro¨dinger writes about visu-
alizability [. . . ] is crap” (Heisenberg, 1979).
∗Thanks to Neil Dewar, Ben Feintzeig, Jim Weatherall, JB Manchak, Noel Swanson, Alex
Meehan, and Jeff Barrett for helpful comments and discussion. This material is based upon
work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DGE 1148900.
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The dispute between Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger continued until von Neumann
(1932) showed that there is a sense in which matrix mechanics and wave mechan-
ics are actually equivalent theories.1 We realized that there was no substantive
choice to be made between these two formulations of quantum mechanics after
all. They were the same theory, just presented in two different guises.
Matrix mechanics and wave mechanics are not the only theories that are
thought to bear this kind of relationship to one another. Indeed, in this paper,
I will consider a pair of theories that has recently received attention from philoso-
phers of physics: Hamiltonian mechanics and Lagrangian mechanics.2 These
two theories are geometric formulations of classical mechanics. In the Hamilto-
nian formulation, the state of a system is specified by its position and momen-
tum, while in the Lagrangian formulation, the state of a system is specified by
its position and velocity. The Hamiltonian formulation uses the mathematical
apparatus of cotangent bundles and Hamiltonians, while the Lagrangian for-
mulation uses the mathematical apparatus of tangent bundles and Lagrangians.
But these are normally taken to be nominal differences between the two theories.
They may be formulated in different languages, but the standard view among
physicists and mathematicians is that Hamiltonian mechanics and Lagrangian
mechanics are nonetheless — like matrix mechanics and wave mechanics —
equivalent theories.
Unfortunately, the standard view about Hamiltonian and Lagrangian me-
chanics is rarely made precise. Textbooks on classical mechanics often assert
that the two formulations are equivalent, but they generally do so without say-
ing what it might mean for two theories to be equivalent.3 North (2009) and
Curiel (2014) have therefore taken the opportunity to dissent from the standard
view. They argue that it is mistaken, and that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics are actually inequivalent theories.
There has been a flurry of recent work — much of which was directly inspired
by North and Curiel’s discussions of classical mechanics — developing tools for
the purpose of answering questions of equivalence between theories.4 My aim
in this paper is to apply these tools to the case of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics. We therefore begin by reviewing the recent work on equivalence. We
discuss a number of different standards of equivalence that have been proposed,
and in doing so, clarify what it might mean for two theories to be equivalent.
We then turn to the case of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics and apply
a particularly promising standard of equivalence, called categorical equivalence,
which was recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson (2012,
2016) and Weatherall (2016a). I show that categorical equivalence allows one
1See Casado (2008) and the references therein for further details.
2See North (2009), Halvorson (2011), Swanson and Halvorson (2012), Curiel (2014), Barrett
(2015), and Teh and Tsementzis (2017).
3For example, see the discussion in Abraham and Marsden (1978, §3.6).
4In addition to the papers already cited, see Andre´ka et al. (2005), Barrett and Halvorson
(2016a,b, 2017a,b), Coffey (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013), Hudetz (2015, 2016),
Knox (2011, 2014), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016), Tsementzis
(2015), Van Fraassen (2014), and Weatherall (2017). See also the classic work by Glymour
(1971, 1977, 1980), Quine (1975), and Sklar (1982).
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to capture the standard view that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are
equivalent. But depending on precisely how one understands the two theories,
categorical equivalence also leaves room for one to follow North and Curiel and
consider Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics inequivalent.
This case study of equivalence in classical mechanics yields three general
philosophical payoffs. First, we will see that questions of equivalence are par-
ticularly sensitive both to the standard for equivalence that one employs, and
to the precise way in which one understands the theories in question. Whether
one considers Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics to be equivalent depends
crucially on what one means by “equivalent,” “Hamiltonian mechanics,” and
“Lagrangian mechanics.” This first payoff is primarily a plea for clarity in our
discussions of equivalence, but the second and third payoffs have more philo-
sophical bite. They concern the question of how we should interpret — or
unravel the content of — our physical theories. I argue that this question is
closely related to questions of equivalence like the one under consideration in
this paper. The tools we use to answer questions of equivalence can also be
used when we interpret our physical theories. The second payoff suggests that
these tools help us to rule out certain unsatisfactory methods of interpreting
our physical theories, while the third payoff suggests that they also point us to
better methods. The moral of these two payoffs is that we should use cases of
equivalent theories as a guide for how best to interpret our physical theories.
2 When are two theories equivalent?
Before turning our attention to the specific case of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics, we need to ask a more general question: Under what conditions
should we consider two theories equivalent?
One way that philosophers of science have approached this question is by
proposing different formal standards of equivalence. One such criterion is em-
ployed by North (2009) in her discussion of classical mechanics. She argues that
Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are inequivalent because models of the
two theories are not isomorphic; there are “differences in structure” between
them (North, 2009, p. 72).5 North’s treatment of classical mechanics points to
the following general standard of equivalence between theories.
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are equivalent according to the model isomor-
phism criterion if for every model of T1 there is an isomorphic model of T2,
and vice versa.
North implicitly relies on something like the model isomorphism criterion
when she infers the inequivalence of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics
from the differences in structure between models of the two theories. She is not
5More precisely, North argues that models of Hamiltonian mechanics have “less structure”
than models of Lagrangian mechanics, which implies that they are not isomorphic. See North
(2009, §3) for a detailed expression of her view, and Halvorson (2011), Swanson and Halvorson
(2012), Curiel (2014), and Barrett (2015) for responses.
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the only proponent of this standard.6 For example, it has recently been argued
by Halvorson (2012) that adherents to the popular “semantic view of theories”
are forced to endorse this standard of equivalence.7 And regardless of one’s
views on the debate between the semantic and syntactic views of theories, the
basic intuition behind the model isomorphism criterion is certainly tempting. If
there is a sense in which the mathematical structure of a theory’s models directly
mirrors the structure of the world, then theories whose models are isomorphic
must “say the same thing” about the world. One might say, for example, that
they “ascribe the same structure” to the world. Conversely, theories whose
models are not isomorphic must “say different things” about the world.
Despite this appealing intuition, the model isomorphism criterion suffers
from a serious shortcoming: It judges too many theories to be inequivalent.
Indeed, it seems to make the wrong verdict when applied to the classic example
of equivalent theories. Since a matrix algebra is not isomorphic to a space of
wavefunctions, the model isomorphism criterion judges Heisenberg’s matrix me-
chanics and Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics to be inequivalent theories. Although
this is certainly an unsettling verdict, I take the following example to be even
more decisive.8
Example 1. It is well known that there are different ways to formulate general
relativity. For example, it can be formulated on a smooth manifold with metric
of signature (1,3), and it can be formulated on a smooth manifold with metric
of signature (3,1). One can picture the models of these two theories as follows:
(1-3) general relativity (3-1) general relativity
There is a strong sense in which these two formulations of general relativity are
6Curiel argues that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are inequvialent because “the
underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic”
(Curiel, 2014, p. 1). This might sound like an endorsement of the model isomorphism criterion,
but he later makes clear that he does not have this standard in mind. Curiel’s conclusion is in-
stead rooted in the idea that these geometric structures have different dynamical and physical
significance for the two theories. See (Curiel, 2014, p.297–9) and the discussion surrounding
our Proposition 3 in what follows.
7For additional discussion see Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013), and Van Fraassen (2014).
8This example appears in Barrett (2015) to illustrate a slightly different point. Additional
examples of undesirable verdicts made by the model isomorphism criterion are offered by
Halvorson (2012).
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equivalent. Indeed, they only differ with respect to a choice of sign convention
(i.e. a choice of whether to “color” the insides of the lightcones white or black).9
These two formulations of general relativity are inequivalent according to the
model isomorphism criterion. Manifolds with metric can only be isomorphic if
their metrics have the same signature. Since models of these two formulations
of general relativity employ metrics of different signatures, they are not isomor-
phic, and the two theories are therefore inequivalent according to the model
isomorphism criterion.
The model isomorphism criterion therefore judges some theories to be in-
equivalent that we actually have good reason to consider equivalent. One is
therefore not licensed to conclude that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics
are inequivalent theories simply because their models are not isomorphic. After
all, they could be equivalent in precisely the same sense as these two formu-
lations of general relativity. If we want to better understand the relationship
between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, we need a better standard for
equivalence of theories than the model isomorphism criterion.
One particularly influential criterion for equivalence, called definitional equiv-
alence, was introduced into philosophy of science by Glymour (1971, 1977, 1980).
The basic idea behind Glymour’s proposal is simple: Theories T1 and T2 are
definitionally equivalent if T1 can define all of the vocabulary that T2 uses, and
in a compatible way, T2 can define all of the vocabulary that T1 uses. Definition-
ally equivalent theories intuitively “say the same thing,” but just use different
vocabulary to say it. Indeed, one can show that there is a precise sense in
which in which definitionally equivalent theories are intertranslatable (Barrett
and Halvorson, 2016b, Theorems 1 and 2). Although definitional equivalence is
often used by logicians as the standard for equivalence of theories, we will not
do so here.
There are two reasons for this.10 First, like the model isomorphism criterion,
definitional equivalence is too strict as a standard for equivalence. There are
theories that are not definitionally equivalent that we nonetheless have good
reason to consider equivalent. Consider the following two examples.
Example 2. It is well-known that there are many different ways to formulate
Euclidean geometry. For example, it can be formulated using the apparatus of
“lines” or it can be formulated using the apparatus of “points.”
9This claim of equivalence depends subtly on what we mean by “general relativity,” and
more precisely, on what we include as allowable forms of matter fields on spacetime. For
example, spinor fields are more easily represented in the framework of (3,1) general relativity
(Wald, 1984, Ch. 13). One might take this to be an important difference between the two
formulations, and use it to judge them inequivalent. I take this to be further evidence for my
Payoff 1 in what follows. Thanks to Erik Curiel for pointing me to this issue.
10See also the discussion in Weatherall (2016a, §5).
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Euclidean geometry with lines Euclidean geometry with points
Although one might like to consider these two formulations to be equivalent —
after all, they are both standardly referred to as “Euclidean geometry” — one
can easily show that they are not definitionally equivalent.11
Example 3. General relativity is normally formulated geometrically by using
a smooth manifold with various structures on it. But in the early 1970s, Ge-
roch (1972) noticed that general relativity could also be formulated in a purely
algebraic fashion by using a structure called an “Einstein algebra.” One can
think of the elements of an Einstein algebra as the smooth scalar functions on
a spacetime.
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general relativity the theory of Einstein algebras
The theory of Einstein algebras was originally proposed by Geroch as another
way to capture “the entire content of general relativity” (Geroch, 1972, p. 1);
the theory is simply another “version” of general relativity. The structure of
a relativistic spacetime can be recovered from that of an Einstein algebra, and
11See Barrett and Halvorson (2017a) for detailed discussion of this case.
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vice versa. One therefore might want to consider the theory of Einstein algebras
equivalent to general relativity. Definitional equivalence, however, does not
provide one with the means to do this. These two theories are not definitionally
equivalent (Rosenstock, Barrett, and Weatherall, 2015).12
If one wants to capture the sense of equivalence in play in Examples 2 and
3, one needs a standard for equivalence that is more liberal than definitional
equivalence.
Example 3 also illustrates our second reason for not using definitional equiv-
alence as our standard for equivalence: Definitional equivalence is a difficult
criterion to apply to theories that are formulated outside the framework of first-
order logic. In order to say whether two theories are definitionally equivalent,
one needs to be able to precisely state what “languages” the theories are formu-
lated in and what counts as a “definition” in these languages. Although there is
a standard way to handle both of these tasks when working with first-order the-
ories, they become considerably more difficult when one is working with more
general kinds of theories, like physical theories.13
One would like a standard of equivalence that does not suffer from the short-
comings of the model isomorphism criterion and definitional equivalence. For-
tunately, such a standard exists, and it is called categorical equivalence. This
criterion was first described by Eilenberg and Mac Lane (1942, 1945), but was
only recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson (2012, 2016)
and Weatherall (2016a).14 Categorical equivalence is the standard for equiva-
lence of theories that we will employ in this paper. It retains one of the basic
intuitions behind definitional equivalence: Categorically equivalent theories are
“intertranslatable.” If T1 and T2 are categorically equivalent, then models of T1
can be “translated” or “converted” into models of T2, and vice versa, and these
translations are (up to isomorphism) inverses of one another.
In order to precisely define categorical equivalence, we need to do a bit of
work. We begin with the following simple observation: The class of models
of a physical theory often has the structure of a category. We will call this
category the category of models of the theory. Two theories are categorically
12Philosophers of physics have debated whether we should consider these theories equivalent.
See Earman (1977a,b, 1979, 1986, 1989a,b), Rynasiewicz (1992), Bain (2003), and Rosenstock,
Barrett, and Weatherall (2015) for discussion.
13Glymour proposes that we use the concept of “covariant definability” to say what counts
as a definition outside the framework of first-order logic. This proposal, however, only works
when one is dealing with theories formulated using the apparatus of differential geometry, so
it does not apply to the theory of Einstein algebras. Of course, this proposal also does little to
address the task of stating what “language” a physical theory is formulated in. Hudetz (2016)
has recently proposed a standard of equivalence, called definable categorical equivalence, that
allows one to handle these difficulties. I suspect that one will be able to prove results about
definable categorical equivalence that correspond to Propositions 1, 2, and 3 in what follows,
but that is left for future work.
14Halvorson (2012, 2016) and Weatherall (2016a, 2017, 2016b) describe various motivations
behind categorical equivalence, while Barrett and Halvorson (2016b) show how it is related
in logical strength to other criteria for equivalence that have been proposed. The reader is
encouraged to consult Mac Lane (1971) and Borceux (1994) for details on category theory. In
what follows, we take for granted the precise definitions of a category and a functor.
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equivalent if their categories of models are “isomorphic” in an appropriate sense.
Describing this sense requires some basic preliminaries from category theory. A
category C is a collection of objects with arrows between the objects that
satisfy some basic properties. The arrows in a category C can be thought of as
the “structure-preserving maps” between the objects of the category. An object
in the category of models of a physical theory is just a model of the theory. The
arrows between objects in the category of models encode the relationships that
different models of the physical theory might bear to one another.
A functor F : C → D is a structure-preserving map between categories C
and D. One can think of a functor as a “way to translate” objects and arrows
of C into objects and arrows of D. A functor F : C → D is full if for all objects
c1, c2 in C and arrows g : Fc1 → Fc2 in D there exists an arrow f : c1 → c2 in
C such that Ff = g. F is faithful if Ff = Fg implies that f = g for all arrows
f : c1 → c2 and g : c1 → c2 in C. F is essentially surjective if for every object
d in D there exists an object c in C such that Fc ∼= d. A functor F : C → D
that is full, faithful, and essentially surjective is called an equivalence. The
categories C and D are equivalent if there exists an equivalence between them.
Following Weatherall (2016a), we will employ the following standard for
equivalence between physical theories.
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are categorically equivalent if there is an
equivalence between the category of models of T1 and the category of models of
T2 that preserves the empirical content of the theories.
Of course, we have yet to say what it might mean for a functor to “preserve
empirical content.” This requirement is simply meant to guarantee that T1 and
T2 are empirically equivalent, in addition to being expressed in equivalent formal
frameworks. Since different theories endow their models with empirical content
in different ways, this requirement is sensitive to the theories being considered.
When we consider two specific functors between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics in the following section, we will state a precise sense in which they
“preserve empirical content.”
Categorical equivalence does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the
criteria considered above. It is a more liberal standard for equivalence than
both the model isomorphism criterion and definitional equivalence: The pairs
of theories from Examples 1, 2, and 3 are categorically equivalent.
Example 1: (1,3) general relativity and (3,1) general relativity are categor-
ically equivalent. The most natural way to define categories of models
for these theories is to take the objects of the categories to be manifolds
with metrics of the appropriate signature, and to take the arrows in the
categories to be isometries. One can then easily verify that these two
categories are equivalent, and furthermore, that the functor F realizing
the equivalence preserves the empirical content of the theories. (The mod-
els (M, gab) and F (M, gab) agree about everything of physical significance:
They have the same covariant derivative operator, they agree about which
curve are timelike, spacelike, and lightlike, etc.)
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Example 2: The category of models of Euclidean geometry with points is
equivalent to the category of models of Euclidean geometry with lines.
This follows from the results proven by Barrett and Halvorson (2017a,
2016b).
Example 3: Categorical equivalence can also be used to capture the sense in
which general relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras are equivalent
theories (Rosenstock, Barrett, and Weatherall, 2015).
Examples 1 and 3 illustrate in addition that categorical equivalence can easily
be applied outside the framework of first-order logic. We will therefore use it as
our standard of equivalence in what follows.
3 Preliminaries on classical mechanics
Now that we have in hand a standard for equivalence of theories, we can consider
the specific case of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics. We begin with some
preliminaries on these two theories.15
Consider a classical system of n particles. The positions of these particles
can be encoded by a single point p in a 3n-dimensional smooth manifold M
called configuration space. The statespaces of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics are “built on top of” configuration space.
Hamiltonian mechanics
The statespace of Hamiltonian mechanics is the 6n-dimensional smooth
manifold T ∗M , the cotangent bundle of configuration space. A point (p, ω) ∈
T ∗M encodes the positions and momenta of all the particles in the system. The
cotangent bundle T ∗M comes naturally equipped with various geometric struc-
tures that are employed in Hamiltonian mechanics. For example, the canonical
one-form is the smooth tensor field on T ∗M that takes the value
θa
∣∣
(p,ω)
= pi∗(ω)
at a point (p, ω) ∈ T ∗M , where pi∗ is the pullback of the standard projection
pi : T ∗M → M . And the canonical symplectic form on T ∗M is the smooth
field Ωab = −daθb. One can verify that Ωab is indeed a symplectic form (i.e. it
is closed, anti-symmetric, and non-degenerate).
As with other mathematical objects, there are “structure-preserving maps”
between cotangent bundles. Given a diffeomorphism f : M1 →M2, the point∗-
transformation T ∗f : T ∗M2 → T ∗M1 is the map defined by T ∗f : (p, ω) 7→
(f−1(p), f∗(ω)). Point∗-transformations are diffeomorphisms and also preserve
15The reader is encouraged to consult Abraham and Marsden (1978) or Mac Lane (1968)
for further details. We will use the “abstract index notation” for tensor fields on the tangent
and cotangent bundles T∗M and T ∗M . We will also occasionally use this notation for tensors
on M , but it will always be clear from context which is meant.
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the geometric structures on the cotangent bundle. Indeed, if θa and θ̂a are
the canonical one-forms on T ∗M1 and T ∗M2, then every point∗-transformation
T ∗f : T ∗M2 → T ∗M1 satisfies (T ∗f)∗(θa) = θ̂a. This immediately implies in ad-
dition that (T ∗f)∗(Ωab) = Ω̂ab, where Ωab and Ω̂ab are the canonical symplectic
forms on T ∗M1 and T ∗M2.
The structure of the cotangent bundle alone, however, is not enough to run
the theory. One also needs to provide some energy properties in order to say
how the system will evolve over time. In Hamiltonian mechanics this is done by
specifying a Hamiltonian for the system, a smooth scalar function H : T ∗M →
R that encodes the “total energy” of the system. A model of Hamiltonian
mechanics is then a pair (T ∗M,H), where T ∗M is a cotangent bundle and
H is a Hamiltonian. The Hamiltonian vector field (XH)
a is the unique
smooth field on T ∗M that satisfies Ωab(XH)a = dbH. The non-degeneracy of
Ωab guarantees that the field (XH)
a exists and is unique. Given Hamiltonians
H1 : T
∗M → R and H2 : T ∗M → R, one can easily verify that (XH1)a = (XH2)a
if and only if H1 = H2 + c for some constant c ∈ R. The Hamiltonian vector
field encodes the dynamics of the system. If the system’s initial state is given by
the point (p, ω) ∈ T ∗M , then the system evolves by “flowing” this state along
the Hamiltonian vector field. More precisely, the integral curves of the vector
field (XH)
a are the trajectories through the Hamiltonian statespace T ∗M along
which the system might evolve, and one proves that Hamilton’s equations hold
along these curves (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Proposition 3.3.2).
For our purposes, we will be particularly interested in “hyperregular” models
of Hamiltonian mechanics. We take a moment here to say what this means.
Given a model of Hamiltonian mechanics (T ∗M,H), the fiber derivative of
H is the map
HH : T ∗M → T∗M HH : (p, α) 7−→ (p,HqH(α)),
where T∗M is the tangent bundle of M and the vector HpH(α) ∈ TpM is defined
by its action
HpH(α) · β =
d
dt
H(p, α+ tβ)
∣∣
t=0
on covectors β ∈ T pM . The map HH is smooth and fiber-preserving. When
HH is a diffeomorphism, the model (T ∗M,H) is called hyperregular and the
Hamiltonian H is referred to as a hyperregular Hamiltonian.
Lagrangian mechanics
Lagrangian mechanics is formulated in a similar manner. The statespace of
Lagrangian mechanics is the 6n-dimensional tangent bundle T∗M of configu-
ration space. A point (p, v) ∈ T∗M encodes the positions and velocities of all the
particles in the system. The structure-preserving maps between tangent bun-
dles are defined analogously to the above point∗-transformations. Given a dif-
feomorphism f : M1 → M2, the point∗-transformation T∗f : T∗M1 → T∗M2
is defined by T∗f : (p, v) 7→ (f(p), f∗(v)).
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In Lagrangian mechanics, the energy properties of the system are encoded
by the system’s Lagrangian, a smooth scalar function L : T∗M → R that
specifies the “liveliness” or “activity” of the system. A model of Lagrangian
mechanics is then a pair (T∗M,L), where T∗M is a tangent bundle and L is a
Lagrangian.
We will again be primarily interested in hyperregular models of Lagrangian
mechanics. This concept is defined analogously to above. Given a model of
Lagrangian mechanics (T∗M,L), the fiber derivative of L is the map
LL : T∗M → T ∗M LL : (p, v) 7−→ (p,LpL(v)),
where the covector LpL(v) ∈ T pM is defined by its action
LpL(v) · w =
d
dt
L(p, v + tw)
∣∣
t=0
on vectors w ∈ TpM . The map LL is smooth and fiber-preserving, and it is
often called the Legendre transformation associated with the Lagrangian L.
When LL is a diffeomorphism, the model (T∗M,L) is called hyperregular and
the Lagrangian L is referred to as a hyperregular Lagrangian.
The total energy associated with the Lagrangian L is the smooth scalar
function EL : T∗M → R defined by EL(p, v) = LpL(v)·v−L(p, v).When (T∗M,L)
is hyperregular, the geometric structures from the statespace of Hamiltonian me-
chanics naturally transfer onto the statespace of Lagrangian mechanics. In par-
ticular, the tangent bundle T∗M inherits a symplectic form (LL)∗(Ωab), where
Ωab is the canonical symplectic form on T
∗M . The tensor (LL)∗(Ωab) is guaran-
teed to be a symplectic form because LL is a diffeomorphism. The Lagrangian
vector field (XL)
a on T∗M is the unique smooth field on T∗M that satisfies
(LL)∗(Ωab)(XL)a = dbEL. Like the Hamiltonian vector field, the Lagrangian
vector field encodes the dynamics of the system. The integral curves of (XL)
a
are the trajectories through the Lagrangian statespace T∗M along which the
system evolves, and one accordingly proves that the Euler-Lagrange equations
hold along these curves (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Theorem 3.5.17).
4 Are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics
equivalent theories?
In order to say whether or not Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are
categorically equivalent, we need to complete two tasks. We will first describe
“translations” between the theories that are candidates for functors, and then
we will define categories of models for these two theories.
As we have seen, Hamiltonian mechanics is formulated using the mathe-
matical apparatus of cotangent bundles and Hamiltonians, while Lagrangian
mechanics is formulated using the mathematical apparatus of tangent bundles
and Lagrangians. But there is a natural way to translate between these two
formulations. One can convert hyperregular models of Lagrangian mechanics
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into hyperregular models of Hamiltonian mechanics, and in addition, structure-
preserving maps between tangent bundles into structure-preserving maps be-
tween cotangent bundles.16 We define this “translation” F as follows.
F : (T∗M,L) 7−→ (T ∗M,EL ◦ L−1L )
F : T∗f 7−→ T ∗(f−1)
The model (T ∗M,EL ◦L−1L ) of Hamiltonian mechanics is hyperregular. Indeed,
one can show that HEL◦L−1L = L
−1
L (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Proposition
3.6.8).
There is also a natural way to convert hyperregular models of Hamiltonian
mechanics into hyperregular models of Lagrangian mechanics, and structure-
preserving maps between cotangent bundles into structure-preserving maps be-
tween tangent bundles. We define this “translation” G as follows.
G : (T ∗M,H) 7−→ (T∗M, (θa(XH)a −H) ◦ H−1H )
G : T ∗f 7−→ T∗(f−1)
The field θa is the canonical one-form on T
∗M and (XH)a is the Hamilto-
nian vector field on T ∗M corresponding to H. One can verify that the model
(T∗M, (θa(XH)a − H) ◦ H−1H ) is a hyperregular model of Lagrangian mechan-
ics with L(θa(XH)a−H)◦H−1H = H
−1
H (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Proposition
3.6.7).
We should take a moment to unravel the idea behind the translations F and
G. Given a hyperregular model of Lagrangian mechanics (T∗M,L), F builds
a corresponding model of Hamiltonian mechanics. It does this by using the
Legendre transformation LL to “pull back” the total energy function EL onto
the cotangent bundle T ∗M . And F simply converts the point∗-transformation
T∗f into the corresponding point∗-transformation T ∗(f−1). The idea behind G
is perfectly analogous. Given a hyperregular model of Hamiltonian mechanics
(T ∗M,H), G builds a corresponding model of Lagrangian mechanics. The scalar
function θa(XH)
a−H on the cotangent bundle T ∗M encodes the “liveliness” or
“activity” of the Hamiltonian system. G uses the fiber derivative HH to “pull
back” this function onto T∗M . And G converts the point∗-transformation T ∗f
into the corresponding point∗-transformation T∗(f−1).
The translations F and G are closely related to one another. Indeed, we
have the following fundamental result (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Theorem
3.6.9).
16For the purposes of this paper we will only consider the case of hyperregular Hamilto-
nian and Lagrangian mechanics. One can, of course, consider the more general case, but I
conjecture that there the theories will be inequivalent according to any reasonable standard
of equivalence. There is no natural way to translate a non-hyperregular model of the one
theory into a model of the other. In the hyperregular case, the maps F and G defined below
are the only natural candidates for “good translations” between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics. There are no other known maps that preserve the empirical content of the theories
in the way made precise by Theorems 2 and 3.
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Theorem 1. F and G are “inverses,” in the sense that GF (T∗M,L) = (T∗M,L)
and FG(T ∗M,H) = (T ∗M,H) for all hyperregular models of Lagrangian me-
chanics (T∗M,L) and hyperregular models of Hamiltonian mechanics (T ∗M,H).
Theorem 1 strongly suggests that we will be able to show that F and G
are equivalences between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics. But in order
to apply categorical equivalence as it is stated above, we will need to verify in
addition that there is a sense in which F and G “preserve the empirical content”
of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics. The following two theorems are
normally taken to do precisely this. These results guarantee that F and G both
map models of the one theory to models of the other theory that agree on the
allowable trajectories for particles in the system.
One more piece of terminology is necessary in order to state these results. If
γ : I → T∗M is an integral curve of (XL)a, then we call the curve pi◦γ : I →M a
base integral curve of (XL)
a, where pi : T∗M →M is the canonical projection.
A base integral curve of (XL)
a encodes one way that the positions of particles in
a system with Lagrangian L might evolve over time. The base integral curves of
(XH)
a are defined analogously, and they encode the ways that the positions of
particles in a system with Hamiltonian H might evolve over time. The following
theorem captures a sense in which F preserves empirical content (Abraham and
Marsden, 1978, Theorem 3.6.2).
Theorem 2. If (T∗M,L) is a hyperregular model of Lagrangian mechanics and
F (T∗M,L) = (T ∗M,EL ◦ L−1L ) is the corresponding model of Hamiltonian me-
chanics, then (XL)
a and (XEL◦L−1L )
a have the same base integral curves.
The model (T∗M,L) of Lagrangian mechanics and the model F (T∗M,L) of
Hamiltonian mechanics therefore agree on how the positions of particles in the
system will evolve over time. Theorem 3 follows immediately from Theorems 1
and 2. It guarantees that the models (T ∗M,H) and G(T ∗M,H) also agree on
how the positions of particles will evolve over time.
Theorem 3. If (T ∗M,H) is a hyperregular model of Hamiltonian mechanics
and G(T ∗M,H) = (T∗M, (θa(XH)a − H) ◦ H−1H ) is the corresponding model
of Lagrangian mechanics, then (XH)
a and (X(θb(XH)b−H)◦H−1H )
a have the same
base integral curves.
Theorems 2 and 3 together capture a robust sense in which the translations
F and G preserve empirical content.
In order to say whether or not F or G can be thought of as equivalences
between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, we need to define categories
of models for these theories. In general, there is more than one way to define
a category of models for a physical theory. Different ways of understanding the
mathematical apparatus behind the theory will correspond to different ways of
defining a category of models for the theory. In particular, the way that one
defines the arrows in the category of models depends on which mathematical
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structures one takes to be essential in formulating the theory.17 In what follows,
therefore, we consider three different ways of defining categories of models for
Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics. In each case we prove whether or not
F and G are equivalences.
Tangent bundle vs. cotangent bundle
The first way of defining categories of models for Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics that we will consider substantiates the standard view about these
theories. We define the categories of models Lag1 and Ham1 for Lagrangian
and Hamiltonian mechanics as follows.
• An object in the category Lag1 is a hyperregular model (T∗M,L) of La-
grangian mechanics. An arrow (T∗M1, L1) → (T∗M2, L2) is a point∗-
transformation T∗f : T∗M1 → T∗M2 that preserves the Lagrangian in the
sense that L2 ◦ T∗f = L1.
• An object in the category Ham1 is a hyperregular model (T∗M,H) of
Hamiltonian mechanics. An arrow (T ∗M1, H1)→ (T ∗M2, H2) is a point∗-
transformation T ∗f : T ∗M1 → T ∗M2 that preserves the Hamiltonian in
the sense that H2 ◦ T ∗f = H1.
One can easily verify that Lag1 and Ham1 are categories. This is one par-
ticularly natural way of defining categories of models for Hamiltonian and La-
grangian mechanics. Arrows in Lag1 are simply required to preserve the struc-
ture of the tangent bundle and the Lagrangian, while arrows in Ham1 are
required to preserve the structure of the cotangent bundle and the Hamilto-
nian.
We now have the following simple result.
Proposition 1. F : Lag1 → Ham1 and G : Ham1 → Lag1 are equivalences.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 captures a sense in which the standard view about Hamilto-
nian and Lagrangian mechanics is correct. According to one particularly natural
way of defining categories of models for these theories, they are categorically
equivalent. Given a hyperregular model of Lagrangian mechanics one can use
the map F to construct a hyperregular model of Hamiltonian mechanics that
has the same empirical content. And conversely, given a hyperregular model
of Hamiltonian mechanics one can use the map G to construct a hyperregular
model of Lagrangian mechanics that has the same empirical content. Proposi-
tion 1 therefore provides us with a clear and precise sense in which Hamiltonian
and Lagrangian mechanics are equivalent theories.
17Weatherall (2017) presents examples of categories of models for other physical theories.
See Curiel (2014) for a nice discussion of which mathematical structures in Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian mechanics one should take to have physical significance.
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Tangent bundle vs. symplectic manifold
But there are other ways to define categories of models for Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian mechanics. Indeed, we will now consider one alternative way to
define a category of models for Hamiltonian mechanics.
The motivation behind this alternative way of defining a category of mod-
els for Hamiltonian mechanics is the following: Hamiltonian mechanics can be
formulated on an arbitrary symplectic manifold, rather than on a cotangent
bundle.18 The basic idea is that the cotangent bundle has strictly “more struc-
ture” than is necessary to stipulate the dynamics of Hamiltonian mechanics. In
fact, as one can verify by examining the definition of the Hamiltonian vector
field above, the only structures that are necessary are a symplectic form and
a Hamiltonian. Since the cotangent bundle has “superfluous structure,” math-
ematicians and physicists will often formulate Hamiltonian mechanics on an
arbitrary symplectic manifold instead. A model of this more general formula-
tion of Hamiltonian mechanics is a tuple (M,Ωab, H), where Ωab is a symplectic
form on the manifold M and H : M → R is a smooth scalar function, again
called the Hamiltonian. One again defines the Hamiltonian vector field to be
the unique field satisfying Ωab(XH)
a = dbH, and then shows that Hamilton’s
equations hold along integral curves of (XH)
a.
If one has in mind this more general formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics,
then one will naturally be led to consider the following category of models Ham2
for Hamiltonian mechanics instead of Ham1.
• An object in the category Ham2 is a tuple (M,Ωab, H), as defined above.
An arrow between objects (M,Ωab, H) → (N, Ω̂ab, Ĥ) in Ham2 is a dif-
feomorphism f : M → N that preserves the symplectic form and the
Hamiltonian, in the sense that f∗(Ω̂ab) = Ωab and Ĥ ◦ f = H.
One can easily verify that Ham2 is a category.
In order for F to be a candidate for a functor from Lag1 to Ham2, we need
to slightly revise the earlier definition. For every object (T∗M,L) in Lag1 we
need F (T∗M,L) to be an object in Ham2, so we need to think of the map F
as follows:
F : (T∗M,L) 7−→ (T ∗M,Ωab, EL ◦ L−1L )
F : T∗f 7−→ T ∗(f−1)
where Ωab is the canonical symplectic form on T
∗M . While F is a functor from
Lag1 to Ham2 (see Lemma 2 in the appendix), note that G is not a functor
from Ham2 to Lag1. There simply is no way to think of G as a “translation”
from this general formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics to Lagrangian mechan-
ics. The map G is only defined for models of Hamiltonian mechanics whose
18See Abraham and Marsden (1978, §3.3) for details on this formulation. It is considered
by North (2009) and leads her to conclude that models of Hamiltonian mechanics have less
structure than models of Lagrangian mechanics. One wonders whether there is also a corre-
spondingly general formulation of Lagrangian mechanics.
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underlying manifold is a cotangent bundle. Since not every symplectic manifold
is a cotangent bundle, there are objects of Ham2 on which G is not defined.
This immediately implies that G is not an equivalence. The following propo-
sition shows that F is not an equivalence either.
Proposition 2. Neither F : Lag1 → Ham2 nor G : Ham2 → Lag1 is an
equivalence.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 captures a sense in which Lagrangian mechanics is inequivalent
to this general formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics. This verdict is intuitive.
The mathematical apparatus of Lagrangian mechanics simply is not the same
as the mathematical apparatus of this general formulation of Hamiltonian me-
chanics. Objects in Lag1 have “bundle structure”; there is a privileged way in
which tangent bundles split into “base points” and “fibers” above these base
points. Since objects in Ham2 are arbitrary symplectic manifolds, and not
necessarily cotangent bundles, they do not have this structure. This captures
the basic idea that North (2009) has about the relationship between these two
theories: Models of this more general formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics
have “less structure” than models of Lagrangian mechanics. Since the functor
F : Lag1 → Ham2 is not an equivalence, this provides us with a good rea-
son to consider Lagrangian mechanics inequivalent to Hamiltonian mechanics
formulated on an arbitrary symplectic manifold.
Lagrangian vector field vs. Hamiltonian vector field
The first case that we considered captured a sense in which Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian mechanics might be considered equivalent, while the second case
captured a sense in which Hamiltonian mechanics — if it is understood as for-
mulated on an arbitrary symplectic manifold — can be considered inequivalent
to Lagrangian mechanics. This final case demonstrates another sense in which
one might consider these two theories inequivalent.
This sense corresponds to another natural way of defining categories of mod-
els for Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics. The arrows in the categories
Lag1, Ham1, and Ham2 were required to preserve the Lagrangian and Hamil-
tonian functions “on the dot.” One might worry that this is too strict a require-
ment. One might think, for example, that the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian vec-
tor fields encode all of the dynamically important information about these two
theories. The exact real number value that the Hamiltonians and Lagrangians
take is not all that important; it is a kind of “surplus structure” to the theory.
The following example makes this worry precise. The worry is illustrated here
by using models of Hamiltonian mechanics, but one could just as easily use
models of Lagrangian mechanics.
Example 4. Let M be a smooth manifold with gab a Riemannian metric on M
and c ∈ R a positive real number. Consider the Hamiltonians H1 : T ∗M → R
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and H2 : T
∗M → R defined by
H1 : (p, ωa) 7−→ gabωaωb H2 : (p, ωa) 7−→ gabωaωb + c
One can easily verify that (T ∗M,H1) and (T ∗M,H2) are hyperregular models
of Hamiltonian mechanics. Since H1 and H2 differ only by a constant, we see
that (XH1)
a = (XH2)
a. One might therefore claim that these two models of
Hamiltonian mechanics encode precisely the same information about a physical
system. They agree about how the positions and momenta of the particles in
the system will evolve over time. The two models are, however, not isomorphic
in the category Ham1 nor in the category Ham2. In fact, one can show there
are no arrows between these objects in Ham1 and Ham2. This follows from
the fact that H1(p,0) = 0 for every p ∈M , while H2 is positive everywhere on
T ∗M .
If one thinks that the two models from Example 4 encode the same infor-
mation about the system under consideration, then one will want the category
of models for Hamiltonian mechanics to reflect this fact. This thought leads
one to define new categories of models Ham3 and Lag2 for Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian mechanics. In these new categories, the arrows are not required to
preserve the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian functions “on the dot.” Rather, they
are merely required to preserve the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian vector fields.
• An object in the category Lag2 is a hyperregular model (T∗M,L) of La-
grangian mechanics. An arrow (T∗M1, L1) → (T∗M2, L2) is a point∗-
transformation T∗f : T∗M1 → T∗M2 that preserves the Lagrangian vector
fields in the sense that (T∗f)∗(XL1)
a = (XL2)
a.
• An object in the category Ham3 is a hyperregular model (T ∗M,H) of
Hamiltonian mechanics. An arrow (T ∗M1, H1)→ (T ∗M2, H2) is a point∗-
transformation T ∗f : T∗M1 → T∗M2 that preserves the Hamiltonian vec-
tor fields in the sense that (T ∗f)∗(XH1)
a = (XH2)
a.
As before, one can easily verify that these are categories. Arrows in Lag2 pre-
serve the structure of the tangent bundle and the Lagrangian vector field; arrows
in Ham3 preserve the structure of the cotangent bundle and the Hamiltonian
vector field. One can easily verify that the two models from Example 4 are
isomorphic as objects in Ham3.
We can now ask whether or not F and G are equivalences between Lag2
and Ham3. The following proposition answers this question in the negative.
Proposition 3. Neither F : Lag2 → Ham3 nor G : Ham3 → Lag2 is an
equivalence.
Proof. See appendix.19
19The proof of Proposition 3 shows that there are Lagrangians that give rise to the same
Lagrangian vector field, but do not “translate” into Hamiltonians that give rise to the same
Hamiltonian vector field. I take this to substantiate Curiel’s remark that the “Legendre
transform does not respect the kinematical constraints of Lagrangian mechanics” (Curiel,
2014, 42). The seeds for the proof of Proposition 3 are contained in (Abraham and Marsden,
1978, 216-217).
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Proposition 2 substantiates the thought that North (2009) has about the in-
equivalence of these two formulations of classical mechanics. I take Proposition
6.3 to substantiate the thought that Curiel (2014) has about their inequivalence.
Curiel remarks that the “Legendre transform does not respect the kinematical
constraints of Lagrangian mechanics” (Curiel, 2014, 42). The proof of Proposi-
tion 6.3 essentially demonstrates this. It shows that there are Lagrangians that
give rise to the same Lagrangian vector field, but do not translate — via the
Legendre transform — into Hamiltonians that give rise to the same Hamiltonian
vector field.
This proposition therefore captures another sense in which one might con-
sider Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics inequivalent theories. We should
take a moment to unravel the intuition behind this verdict. There is a pre-
cise sense in which a Hamiltonian vector field (XH)
a encodes more information
about the Hamiltonian H than a Lagrangian vector field (XL)
a encodes about
the Lagrangian L or the total energy function EL. The Hamiltonian vector field
(XH)
a implicitly defines the Hamiltonian H up to a constant. We have already
remarked above that for Hamiltonians H1 : T
∗M → R and H2 : T ∗M → R,
(XH1)
a = (XH2)
a if and only if H1 = H2 + c for some constant c ∈ R. If two
models of Hamiltonian mechanics agree on the Hamiltonian vector field, then
they must also agree (at least up to a constant) on the Hamiltonian.
The same cannot be said of models of Lagrangian mechanics. The La-
grangian vector field (XL)
a neither implicitly defines the Lagrangian L nor the
total energy function EL up to a constant. The proof of Proposition 3 demon-
strates precisely this. It provides an example of two models of Lagrangian
mechanics (T∗M,L1) and (T∗M,L2) that have the same Lagrangian vector field
(XL1)
a = (XL2)
a, but do not agree (even up to a constant) on the Lagrangian
nor on the total energy function of the system. The Hamiltonian vector field
defines a scalar function up to a constant, while the Lagrangian vector field
does not. The Hamiltonian vector field therefore gives rise to “more structure”
than the Lagrangian vector field does. Indeed, one might summarize the content
of Proposition 3 as follows: The mathematical apparatus of cotangent bundle
plus Hamiltonian vector field is not the same as the mathematical apparatus of
tangent bundle plus Lagrangian vector field. If one thinks of Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian mechanics as best represented by the categories of models Ham3
and Lag2, then one has reason to consider these two theories inequivalent.
5 Conclusion
In his 1966 Nobel acceptance speech, Feynman (1966, p. 708) suggested that it
is often useful to have different perspectives on a particular physical theory:
A good theoretical physicist today might find it useful to have a
wide range of physical viewpoints and mathematical expressions of
the same theory available.20
20Thanks to Jeremy Butterfield for pointing me toward this quote and to Alex Meehan for
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Having different viewpoints on a theory may help catalyze progress to newer and
better theories. But in order to reap these benefits we first have to recognize
when two viewpoints are providing us with views of the same theory, and when
they are instead providing us with views of different theories. We have taken a
step here towards doing precisely this in the simple case of classical mechanics.
Proposition 1 substantiates the standard view about these theories and captures
a clear sense in which one might consider them to be equivalent. But Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 show that categorical equivalence leaves room for one to follow
North and Curiel and consider Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics to be
inequivalent theories. It all depends on how one understands the mathematical
apparatus behind the two theories.
Given this end result, one might worry that we have not yet settled whether
or not Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are equivalent theories. One
might be disappointed by the “it depends” kind of answer that we have provided
here. I do not think that we should be disappointed by this kind of answer. In
fact, I believe that the answer provided here is the best kind of answer that
we can expect when approaching questions of equivalence between theories. It
takes a moment to explain why this is the case.
When we are presented with a question like “Are theories T1 and T2 equiv-
alent?”, the first order of business is to clarify what this relationship of equiv-
alence amounts to. That is, we must begin by endorsing a particular standard
of equivalence. Depending on the standard of equivalence that we endorse, we
may find that there is some ambiguity about what exactly the theories T1 and
T2 are. There may be a number of theories that are distinct according to our
preferred standard of equivalence that nonetheless are standardly referred to by
the name “T1” or “T2.” This is precisely what happened in the case of Hamil-
tonian and Lagrangian mechanics. Once we endorse categorical equivalence, we
are forced (or perhaps, allowed) to recognize that there are actually a num-
ber of different theories that are standardly called “Hamiltonian mechanics.”
Hamiltonian mechanics on a cotangent bundle (as represented by the category
Ham1), for example, is a different theory from Hamiltonian mechanics on a
symplectic manifold (as represented by the category Ham2); the two theories
are not categorically equivalent.21
We can only provide a definitive answer to the question “Are T1 and T2
equivalent?” once we have made the question clear and precise. And as the case
of classical mechanics illustrates, there may be a number of different reasonable
ways to go about making the question precise. It depends on what we mean
by “equivalent” and on how we are understanding the theories in question.
This immediately leads us to our first philosophical payoff. While perhaps
unsurprising, it is nonetheless important to keep in mind when we consider
actually finding it. See Meehan (2017) for a careful discussion of this idea.
21Following the proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to verify that these theories are inequivalent.
The intuition behind this verdict is something like the following. Hamiltonian mechanics on a
symplectic manifold has “more models” than Hamiltonian mechanics on a cotangent bundle.
The former theory can be used to describe to a wider range of physical systems than the latter
theory.
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questions of equivalence.
Payoff 1. Whether one considers two theories to be equivalent depends both on
the standard of equivalence that one employs, and on the precise way in which
one understands the two theories in question.
In slogan form, this payoff can be summarized as follows: In order to say
whether Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are equivalent, one must first
say what one means by “Hamiltonian mechanics,” “Lagrangian mechanics,” and
“equivalent.” The same conclusion will obviously apply to any two theories, not
just to these formulations of classical mechanics.
Payoff 1 does not imply that all standards of equivalence are on equal foot-
ing. As we have seen, many criteria make undesirable verdicts. We have good
reason to avoid employing these criteria, and so it is important to be clear about
exactly which standard of equivalence one is employing when answering a partic-
ular question of equivalence. Certain standards — like the model isomorphism
criterion — simply do not provide us with as much interesting information about
the relationship between the theories in question as other standards do. Payoff
1 is a plea for this kind of clarity in our discussions of equivalence.
There are two other general philosophical payoffs that I would like to con-
clude with. Philosophers of science have long been concerned with the following
question:
How should we interpret what a physical theory says about the world?
What is the content of a physical theory?
This question has come to be regarded as one of the most central questions
in philosophy of science; van Fraassen (1986, p. 309), for example, calls it the
“foundational question par excellence.” I would like to suggest that this question
is closely related to the question of when we should consider two theories to be
equivalent. The final two payoffs are concerned with this relationship.
One particular answer to van Fraassen’s question par excellence has recently
become popular among philosophers of physics and metaphysicians. This an-
swer proposes that we should interpret a physical theory by looking to the
mathematical structure of the models of a physical theory and taking it “at face
value.”22 This method of face value interpretation is most clearly described
by North (2009, p. 78):
Take the mathematical formulation of a given theory. Figure out
what structure is required by that formulation. [. . . ] Infer that this
is the fundamental structure of the theory. Go on to infer that this
is the fundamental structure of the world, according to the theory.
This method of interpretation is motivated by a particularly strong form of
“realism” about our physical theories. If one thinks — as realists are inclined
to — that a physical theory provides us with a description of the world, then
22This turn of phrase is borrowed from Maudlin (2013), who makes a similar point to the
one here, but without explicitly mentioning theoretical equivalence.
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it is natural to look to the mathematical structures employed by the models of
the theory for this description. This thought is precisely what leads one to face
value interpretation.
Face value interpretation has in recent years become the “received view” in
philosophy of physics for how to best unravel the content of our physical theo-
ries. A particularly prominent example comes up in discussions of wavefunction
realism in quantum mechanics.23 According to this view, quantum mechanics
requires us to “take the space on which [wavefunctions] are defined, a configura-
tion space of extraordinarily high dimension [. . . ], as the arena in which events
take place” (Myrvold, 2015, p. 3248). Our familiar three-dimensional physical
space becomes secondary to configuration space. Indeed, some have claimed
that “whatever impression we have [. . . ] of living in a three-dimensional space
[. . . ] is somehow flatly illusory” (Albert, 1996, p. 277). One is led to wave-
function realism through a straightforward application of the face value method
of interpreting physical theories. Since in the standard formulation of quantum
mechanics one represents the state of a system with a wavefunction defined on a
high-dimensional configuration space, one takes this mathematical structure at
face value and infers that the physical space we live in is this high-dimensional
configuration space (Albert, 1996, p. 277).
It is not my aim in this paper to offer a sustained argument against wavefunc-
tion realism. Rather, I would like to raise a concern about face value interpre-
tation, the method of interpreting physical theories that led us to wavefunction
realism in the first place. If we accept face value interpretation as our preferred
method of interpreting our physical theories, then we are immediately forced
to conclude — following the same route as North — that Hamiltonian and La-
grangian mechanics are inequivalent theories. Since the statespaces of these two
theories come equipped with different structures, face value interpretation pre-
cludes us from recognizing an equivalence between them. Their models employ
non-isomorphic mathematical structures, and they therefore must be describ-
ing the world in different ways. Lagrangian mechanics ascribes to the world
the structure of a tangent bundle, while Hamiltonian mechanics ascribes to the
world the structure of a cotangent bundle.
Face value interpretation forces us towards a particularly strict standard of
equivalence between theories. Consider the theories from examples 1, 2, and 3
from the perspective of face value interpretation.
Example 1: (1,3) general relativity and (3,1) general relativity. If one takes
the mathematical structures of these two theories at face value, then one
is forced to recognize a difference between them. The former affirms that
at every point of spacetime there are three linearly independent tangent
vectors with negative length, while the latter denies this. These two the-
ories therefore “say different things about the world,” and a face value
interpreter concludes that they are inequivalent.
23This position is endorsed by Albert (1996, 2013), Loewer (1996), Ney (2012, 2013a,b),
and North (2013), among others. See the collected papers in Ney and Albert (2013) and the
references therein.
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Example 2: Euclidean geometry with points and Euclidean geometry with lines.
If we take the mathematical apparatus of these two theories at face value
— and we think of them as describing the world — then the former theory
says that the world is made up of points, while the latter says that the
world is made up of lines. So we are forced to consider these two theories
inequivalent too.
Example 3: General relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras. This case is
perhaps the most dramatic of the three. A face value interpreter of these
two theories will claim that they offer radically different descriptions of
the world — according to the theory of Einstein algebras, the world has
algebraic structure, while according to the standard formulation of general
relativity, the world has the structure of a manifold with metric — and
therefore consider them inequivalent.
As these examples illustrate, face value interpretation forces us to consider
very few pairs of theories equivalent. In general, if we decide to interpret our
physical theories by taking their mathematical structures at face value, then
we are committing ourselves to a form of the model isomorphism criterion.
Face value interpretation maintains that there is a strong sense in which the
mathematical structure of a theory’s models directly “mirrors” the structure of
the world. (Recall, for example, the way in which wavefunction realists argue
that the physical space we live in is configuration space.) If there is such a
close relationship between the mathematical structure of a theory’s models and
the structure of the world, then theories whose models employ non-isomorphic
structures must be saying different things about the world. This is precisely the
content of the model isomorphism criterion. Insofar as we reject the model iso-
morphism criterion as our standard for equivalence between theories, therefore,
we should also reject face value interpretation as an answer to van Fraassen’s
question par excellence. It forces us to make untenable verdicts in many simple
cases of equivalence.
We can use exactly the kind of reasoning employed in this argument against
face value interpretation as a new tool for deciding how best to interpret our
physical theories. This idea is captured by the following payoff.
Payoff 2. When we commit to a particular method of interpreting our physical
theories — that is, a method of reading off the content of a physical theory —
we are also committing ourselves to a standard of equivalence between theories.
If we have a method of interpretation in hand, we will naturally consider
two theories to be equivalent when they have the same content according to
this method. We can therefore evaluate proposed answers to van Fraassen’s
question par excellence by instead evaluating the standard for equivalence that
they induce.
If we use Payoff 2 to reject face value interpretation, then one might worry
that we are forced to adopt a radical form of “anti-realism.” Fortunately, this is
not the case. In fact, radically anti-realist methods of interpreting our physical
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theories commit us to standards of equivalence that are just as unsatisfactory
as the model isomorphism criterion. We can therefore use Payoff 2 to reject
them too. For example, Putnam (1977) famously suggested that we interpret
our theories in such a way that any consistent theory could be true of the
world. But this method of interpretation naturally leads us to judge any pair
of consistent theories to be equivalent. Since any two consistent theories can
be understood as true of the world, they must “say the same thing about the
world.” This standard for equivalence is clearly far too liberal; there are many
pairs of consistent theories that we have good reason to consider inequivalent.
We should therefore look for a method of interpreting our physical theories
that lies somewhere between face value interpretation and Putnam’s radically
anti-realist approach to interpretation. Our discussion here suggests a way to
find such a method.24 I conjecture that the relationship between equivalence
and interpretation is in fact even more robust than Payoff 2 suggests.
Payoff 3. When we commit to a standard for equivalence between physical
theories, we are also committing ourselves to a method of interpreting — or
unraveling the content of — our physical theories.
A standard of equivalence between physical theories goes hand-in-hand with
a method of interpreting our physical theories. When we commit to a particular
standard of equivalence between theories, we are also saying which features
of our theories are significant or “contentful.” I submit that the contentful
features of a theory are precisely those that are invariant under the standard
for equivalence that we adopt. Payoffs 2 and 3 together suggest that questions
of equivalence, like the ones that we have been concerned with throughout this
dissertation, are intimately related to van Fraassen’s question par excellence.
The moral of these two payoffs can be summarized as follows: We should look
to cases of equivalent theories as a guide for how best to interpret our physical
theories. We go a long way towards pinning down what a theory “says about
the world” by pinning down which other theories “say the same thing.”
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to prove Propositions 1, 2, and 3. In order to
prove Proposition 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. F : Lag1 → Ham1 and G : Ham1 → Lag1 are functors.
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Proof. We show that F is a functor. The argument for G is perfectly anal-
ogous. It is trivial that F maps objects of Lag1 to objects of Ham1. Let
T∗f : (T∗M1, L1)→ (T∗M2, L2) be an arrow in Lag1. We show that F (T∗f) =
T ∗(f−1) is an arrow (T ∗M1, EL1 ◦ L−1L1 ) → (T ∗M2, EL2 ◦ L−1L2 ) in Ham1. One
can easily compute both of the following
LL2 ◦ T∗f = T ∗(f−1) ◦ LL1 EL2 ◦ T∗f = EL1
using the fact that L2 ◦ T∗f = L1. Since LL1 and LL2 are diffeomorphisms,
these two equations together imply that EL2 ◦L−1L2 ◦T ∗(f−1) = EL1 ◦L−1L1 . The
point∗-transformation T ∗(f−1) therefore preserves the Hamiltonians and is an
arrow in Ham1. It follows immediately from the definition of F that it respects
composition and preserves identities.
Proposition 1. F : Lag1 → Ham1 and G : Ham1 → Lag1 are equivalences.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that the functors F and G are “inverses” on the
objects of Ham1 and Lag1. F and G are also “inverses” on the arrows of
Ham1 and Lag1. This immediately implies that F and G are equivalences.
We now turn to Proposition 2. Our argument begins with a lemma that is
perfectly analogous to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. F : Lag1 → Ham2 is a functor.
Proof. One argues precisely as in Lemma 1 (using, in addition, the fact that
point∗-transformations preserve the canonical symplectic form).
Proposition 2. Neither F : Lag1 → Ham2 nor G : Ham2 → Lag1 is an
equivalence.
Proof. We have already shown that G is not a functor from Ham2 to Lag1. We
now show that the functor F : Lag1 → Ham2 is neither essentially surjective
nor full. Since there are symplectic manifolds that are not diffeomorphic to
a cotangent bundle, one immediately sees that F is not essentially surjective.
To see that F is not full, consider the cotangent bundle T ∗R ∼= R2 with the
symplectic form and Hamiltonian defined by
Ωab =
1
2
(
(dax1)(dbx2)− (dax2)(dbx1)
)
H(x1, x2) = x
2
1 + x
2
2
where x1 and x2 are the standard coordinate functions on R2. One can verify
that Ωab is the canonical symplectic form on T
∗R and that H is a hyperregular
Hamiltonian H : T ∗R → R. Theorem 1 implies that there is a hyperregular
model of Lagrangian mechanics (T∗R, L) such that F (T∗R, L) = (T ∗R,Ωab, H).
We define the diffeomorphism f : R2 → R2 by f : (x1, x2) 7→ (−x2, x1).
This map satisfies f∗(Ωab) = Ωab and H ◦ f = H, so f : (T ∗R,Ωab, H) →
(T ∗R,Ωab, H) is an arrow in Ham2. But since f is not a point∗-transformation,
f 6= Fg for any arrow g : (T∗R, L)→ (T∗R, L), the functor F is not full.
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We conclude with a proof of Proposition 3. In the now-familiar manner, we
begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. G : Ham3 → Lag2 is a functor.
Proof. It is trivial that G maps objects of Ham3 to objects of Lag2. Let
T ∗f : (T ∗M1, H1) → (T ∗M2, H2) be an arrow in Ham3. This means that
(T ∗f)∗(XH1)
a = (XH2)
a. We need to show that show that G(T ∗f) = T∗(f−1)
is an arrow in Lag2 between G(T
∗M1, H1) → G(T ∗M2, H2). For convenience
we will call G(T ∗M1, H1) = (T∗M1, L1) and G(T ∗M2, H2) = (T∗M2, L2).
We begin by showing that H2 ◦ T ∗f = H1 + c, where c ∈ R is some con-
stant. Let Ωab be the canonical symplectic form on T
∗M1 and Ω̂ab the canonical
symplectic form on T ∗M2. We compute the following:
Ωab(XH2◦T∗f )
a = db(H2 ◦ T ∗f)
= (T ∗f)∗(dbH2)
= (T ∗f)∗
(
Ω̂ab(XH2)
a
)
= Ωab(T
∗f)∗(XH2)
a = Ωab(XH1)
a
The first equality holds by the definition of (XH2◦T∗f )
a, the second since pull-
backs and exterior derivatives commute, the third by the definition of (XH2)
a,
the fourth since (T ∗f)∗(Ω̂ab) = Ωab, and the fifth since T ∗f is an arrow in
Ham3. Since Ωab is non-degenerate, these equalities imply that (XH2◦T∗f )
a =
(XH1)
a. It immediately follows from this that H2 ◦ T ∗f = H1 + c for some
constant c ∈ R. One uses this to show that
HH2 ◦ T ∗f = T∗(f−1) ◦ HH1 (1)
The argument for (1) is a simple computation.
We conclude by computing the following, which implies that T∗(f−1) is an
arrow in Lag2 between (T∗M1, L1)→ (T∗M2, L2).
(T∗(f−1))∗(XL1)
a = (HH2 ◦ T ∗f ◦ H−1H1)∗(XL1)a
= (HH2)∗ ◦ (T ∗f)∗ ◦ (H−1H1)∗(XL1)a
= (HH2)∗ ◦ (T ∗f)∗(XH1)a
= (HH2)∗(XH2)a
= (XL2)
a
The first equality holds by (1), the second by simple properties of the push-
forward, the third and fifth since HH1∗(XH1)a = (XL1)a and HH2∗(XH2)a =
(XL2)
a (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, Theorem 3.6.2), and the fourth since T ∗f
is an arrow in Ham3. This implies that T∗(f−1) is an arrow in Lag2. As in
Lemma 1 one verifies that G respects composition and preserves identities.
Proposition 3. Neither F : Lag2 → Ham3 nor G : Ham3 → Lag2 is an
equivalence.
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Proof. We show that G : Ham3 → Lag2 is not full and that F : Lag2 → Ham3
is not a functor. Let M = R so that T∗M ∼= R2. Consider the two Lagrangians
L1 : T∗M → R and L2 : T∗M → R defined by
L1(x1, x2) = x
2
2 L2(x1, x2) = 2x
2
2
Both of these Lagrangians are hyperregular, so (T∗M,L1) and (T∗M,L2) are
objects in Lag2. Theorem 1 implies that there are objects (T
∗M,H1) and
(T ∗M,H2) in Ham3 such that G(T ∗M,H1) = (T∗M,L1) and G(T ∗M,H2) =
(T∗M,L2).
Now one can easily compute that EL1 6= EL2 + c for any constant c ∈ R;
indeed, EL1 = L1 and EL2 = L2. But one can also compute that (XL1)
a =
(XL2)
a. This second equality implies that the identity point∗-transformation
T∗(1M ) is an arrow (T∗M,L1) → (T∗M,L2) in Lag2. On the other hand,
EL1 6= EL2 + c implies that H1 6= H2 + c for any constant c ∈ R, and so
(XH1)
a 6= (XH2)a. This means that T ∗(1M ) is not an arrow (T ∗M,H1) →
(T ∗M,H2) in Ham3, and G is therefore not full. This argument immediately
implies that F is not a functor from Lag2 to Ham3. F does not map the arrow
T∗(1M ) : (T∗M,L1)→ (T∗M,L2) in Lag2 to an arrow in Ham3.
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